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I. Introduction
Richard Schediwy and Laura Strauss were property owners
who owned land along the Tulloch Reservoir near Copperopolis,
California.1 The two obtained a permit to build a retaining wall
and a dock along the reservoir, and they did so in 2004.2 On April
21, 2004, Tri-Dam, the owner and operator of the Tulloch
Hydroelectric Project, conducted a survey that concluded the
retaining wall and the dock were built below the appropriate
elevation level.3 Over the next several years, Tri-Dam, Schediwy,
and Strauss attempted to resolve the matter but were
unsuccessful.4 Seven years later, litigation ensued as Tri-Dam
sought a permanent injunction that would effectively force

1. See Tri-Dam v. Schediwy, No. 1:11–CV–01141 AWI–SMS, 2011 WL
6692587 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011) (describing the property in question
owned by defendants Schediwy and Strauss).
2. See id. (discussing the construction of Schediwy’s dock).
3. See id. (“Defendants’ contractor built the retaining wall at the 504- to
505-foot elevation contour, in violation of the permit . . . . Tri-Dam further
alleges that the SMP requires that all shoreline protection devices be located
above the 510-foot elevation contour level of Tulloch Reservoir.”).
4. See id. (“Over the course of the next several years, Tri-Dam and
Defendants exchanged numerous communications attempting to resolve the
matter . . . . The retaining wall, however, has never been corrected or
removed.”).
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Schediwy and Strauss to remove their dock.5 The litigation
focused on whether a statute of limitations that was generally
applicable to the government specifically applied to injunctive
relief.6 Though the court eventually ruled in favor of Tri-Dam, the
case highlighted the practical consequences of a current judicial
split affecting a wide variety of actions initiated by the
government.7
In 1948, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 2462.8 That Act, which
recodifies several pieces of prior legislation,9 states as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action,
suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine,
penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be
entertained unless commenced within five years from the date
when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the
offender or the property is found within the United States in
order that proper service may be made thereon.10

In line with Supreme Court precedent that reasons: “‘[i]n a
country where not even treason can be prosecuted, after a lapse of
three years, it could scarcely be supposed, that an individual would
remain forever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture,’”11 § 2462 establishes
5. See id. at *5
The [First Amended Complaint] seeks a permanent injunction:
(1) prohibiting defendants from installing, possessing, or maintaining
property within the Tri-Dam project boundary without seeking prior
approval and obtaining a permit from Tri-Dam; (2) prohibiting
Defendants from installing, possessing, or maintaining property
within the Tri-Dam project boundary that is not in compliance with a
permit obtained from Tri-Dam; and (3) requiring Defendants within
ten days of the permanent injunction to submit plans to Tri-Dam for
removal of the wall.
6. See id. at *6 (discussing the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to TriDam’s claims for equitable relief).
7. See id. (finding that “Tri-Dam may seek equitable relief beyond the
five-year statute of limitation in § 2462 because there is no concurrent legal
remedy that would be barred by the statute”).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012).
9. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1458 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (tracing
the origins of the Act through its prior iterations—28 U.S.C. § 791 and Revised
Statutes § 1047, 18 Stat. 193—which were passed in 1911 and 1874,
respectively).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2462.
11. 3M Co., 17 F.3d at 1457 (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
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a generally applicable statute of limitations for certain actions
instigated by the U.S. government.12 Specifically, the statute of
limitations period applies to actions brought by the federal
government13 that are not controlled by other acts of Congress.14 As
indicated by its plain language, the statute only applies to civil
proceedings.15
Due to the broad nature of the statute, it affects diverse types of
litigation. For example, in 3M Co. v. Browner16 the U.S. Court of
336, 341 (1805)).
12. See FEC v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 17
(D.D.C. 1995) (“Section 2462 provides a catch-all statute of limitations in
situations where Congress did not specifically include a time limitations in the
statute.”).
13. See Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. Nat’l Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785, 788–89
(2d Cir. 1959) (“The federal statute of limitations for penal actions applies only
to actions on behalf of the United States and qui tam actions.”); SEC v.
Williams, 884 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D. Me. 1995) (“Courts have construed § 2462 as a
general statute of limitations applicable ‘to the entire federal government.’”
(quoting 3M Co., 17 F.3d at 1461)); United States v. Magnolia Motor & Logging
Co., 208 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (“The legislative history, taken
together with the specific language of § 2461, indicates an intent to limit the
sections within Chapter 163 of the Judicial Code [including 28 U.S.C. § 2462] to
violations of Acts of Congress, and not to include reference to state
proceedings.”).
14. See Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. at 17 (“Section
2462 provides a catch-all statute of limitations in situations where Congress did
not specifically include a time limitations in the statute.”).
15. See United States v. Memphis Retail Package Stores Ass’n, 334 F.
Supp. 686, 688 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (“After consideration of the statutory
language and the tenor of the decisions interpreting both statutory provisions,
the Court is of the opinion that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 is applicable only in those
actions which involve civil fines and penalties as opposed to criminal fines.”).
16. 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In 3M Co., the Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company (3M) learned that it had violated the Toxic Substance
Control Act (TSCA) between August 1980 and July 1986. Id. at 1454. 3M
subsequently self-reported the violations to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) on September 16, 1986. Id. at 1455. The EPA filed an
administrative complaint against 3M on September 2, 1988, seeking $1.3
million in civil penalties under the TSCA. Id. Invoking § 2462, 3M argued that
the statute barred prosecution of any infractions committed more than five
years prior to the filing of EPA’s complaint. Id. The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) found § 2462 not applicable because, in relevant part, the statute applied
only to judicial, and not administrative, proceedings. Id. The ALJ subsequently
entered judgment against 3M, which the company appealed. Id. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the ALJ’s finding and held
§ 2462 applicable in administrative proceedings. Id. at 1457. In doing so, the
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the statute
applied to matters instigated by federal agencies.17 Consequently,
analysis of § 2462 features prominently not only in diverse litigation
matters, but also actions brought by the Securities and Exchange
Commission,18 Federal Trade Commission,19 Federal Aviation
Administration,20 and the Federal Election Commission,21 as well as
various environmental proceedings.22
court recognized that, although few courts had directly addressed the issue,
decisions from other jurisdictions indicated the statute should, in fact, be
applied to administrative proceedings. Id. at 1455–57. The court then reasoned
that an agency’s adjudication of a civil penalty case readily fit within the
description of an “action, suit or proceeding” as described by the statute. Id. at
1456. Finally, the court concluded that an administrative agency’s adjudicatory
action would fall within the scope of language contained in § 2462’s predecessor
statutes. Id.
17. See id. at 1457 (“Given the reasons why we have statutes of limitations,
there is no discernible rationale for applying § 2462 when the penalty action or
proceeding is brought in a court, but not when it is brought in an administrative
agency.”).
18. See, e.g., SEC v. Wyly, 788 F. Supp. 2d 92, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“Section 21(d)(3) [of the Exchange Act] does not contain a statute of limitations.
Therefore, the catch-all five-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 . . .
governs punitive relief sought by the SEC under section 21(d)(3).”); SEC v.
Williams, 884 F. Supp. 28, 29 (D. Mass. 1995) (“This case presents an issue of
first impression in the First Circuit: whether S.E.C. actions for an injunction
and disgorgement are subject to the five-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462, the general statute of limitations for government actions aimed at
imposing a ‘fine, penalty, or forfeiture.’”).
19. See, e.g., FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 n.2 (D.D.C.
1978) (finding that in an action brought by the Federal Trade Commission “[t]he
plaintiff’s recovery is limited to violations occurring within the five years prior
to the date of the complaint, June 18, 1974, because the five-year statute of
limitations for civil penalty actions, 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1970), is applicable”).
20. See, e.g., Coghlan v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 470 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2006) (“We agree with the FAA that § 2462 did not apply to Coughlan’s
revocation proceedings, and that even if it did, it did not preclude revocation of
his ATP certificate.”).
21. See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15,
17–19 (D.D.C. 1995) (applying § 2462 to alleged violations of the Federal
Elections Campaign Act).
22. For examples of § 2462 applying to actions brought under the Clean Air
Act, see, e.g., Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 480
F.3d 410, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that § 2462 applied to actions brought
under the Clean Air Act when the United States declined to raise sovereign
immunity as a threshold defense); United States v. Walsh, 8 F.3d 659, 662 (9th
Cir. 1993) (stating that because the Government’s action was for the
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Although § 2462 generally applies to a wide range of matters,
courts disagree as to the specific claims that should be subject to the
federal statute of limitations. Particularly, the federal circuit courts
of appeals disagree as to whether § 2462 bars only claims for legal
relief, or whether § 2462 also bars claims for injunctive relief.23 This
Note provides an in-depth look at the relevant circuit split and
concludes that § 2462 does not bar claims for injunctive relief.
Part II examines important legal principles applicable to an
analysis of § 2462, focusing on the significance of the doctrines of
laches, the concurrent remedy rule, and sovereign immunity.24 Part
III discusses the varying approaches the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have taken in
applying § 2462 to claims for injunctive relief.25 Part IV argues that
the plain language of § 2462 does not apply to claims for injunctive
relief and rejects a case-by-case analysis of this issue that focuses on
each individual injunction’s characteristics.26 Additionally, Part IV
argues that courts have misapplied the concurrent remedy rule
when they discuss whether § 2462 bars claims for injunctive relief.27
Part V provides recommendations for how courts should treat
claims for injunctive relief under § 2462.28

enforcement of a civil penalty under the Clean Air Act, the appropriate statute
of limitations was 28 U.S.C. § 2462). For examples of § 2462 applying to actions
brought under the Clean Water Act, see, e.g., Pub. Interest Research Grp. of
N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 73–77 (3d Cir. 1990)
(ruling that § 2462 applies to citizens suits brought under the Clean Water Act);
Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“Application of section 2462 to citizen enforcement suits [brought under the
Clean Water Act] is in keeping with the language of the statute; a citizen
enforcement suit is also an ‘action . . . for the enforcement of [a] civil fine.’”
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012))).
23. Infra Part III.
24. Infra Part II.
25. Infra Part III.
26. Infra Part IV.
27. Infra Part IV.
28. Infra Part V.
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II. Analysis of the Doctrines of Laches, the Concurrent Remedy
Rule, and the Government’s Sovereign Immunity
A. Laches
Before discussing whether the statute of limitations
contained in § 2462 should apply to claims for injunctive—as well
as legal—relief, it is helpful to consider the types of time
restrictions that bar suits in American common law. Under the
American common law system, specific statutes of limitations
govern actions at law, while the doctrine of laches controls suits
in equity.29 Because this Note focuses on whether § 2462 should
control claims for injunctive relief, a traditional equitable
remedy,30 it is necessary to examine the doctrine of laches and its
application.
The doctrine of laches stems from the equitable maxim
“equity aids the vigilant.”31 Historically, chancery courts
established the doctrine of laches because statutes of limitation
did not apply in equitable courts.32 The doctrine primarily holds
that equitable claims “must be asserted in a reasonable time, or
equitable relief will be refused.”33 Because laches is a doctrine
29. See DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL
REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 250 (2010) (“American law has two time bars: the
statute of limitations for a common-law action and . . . the judge-made doctrine
of laches for an [e]quitable remedy.”).
30. See DAN. B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 9
(2d ed. 1993) (“The damages remedy was historically a legal remedy. The
injunction and most other coercive remedies were equitable.”).
31. See JAMES W. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 52 (1901)
(stating that “[e]quity aids the vigilant, not the indolent”); RENDLEMAN, supra
note 29, at 251 (stating the maxim as “[e]quity aids the vigilant, not those who
slumber in their rights”).
32. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 29, at 251 (“Chancery courts developed
laches because [e]quity lacked a statute of limitations.”).
33. EATON, supra note 31, at 53; see also Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287
(1940) (“[E]quity, in the absence of any statute of limitations made applicable to
equity suits, has provided its own rule of limitations through the doctrine of
laches, the principle that equity will not aid a plaintiff whose unexcused delay,
if the suit were allowed, would be prejudicial to the defendant.”); A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028–29 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (“In a legal context, laches may be defined as the neglect or delay in
bringing suit to remedy an alleged wrong, which taken together with laps of
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sounding in equity, it generally bars equitable claims regardless
of whether a statute of limitations bars the corresponding legal
claim for relief.34 Further, because laches is an equitable doctrine,
its enforcement is typically less rigid than enforcement of an
analogous statute of limitation.35 Finally, laches is the standard
time bar for injunctions.36
Both the doctrine of laches and statutes of limitation advance
numerous public policies. Specifically, these time bars promote
the policies of “repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty
about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s
potential liabilities.”37 Thus, these time restrictions foster just
results by ensuring that evidence remains reliable and that all
litigants are aware of their rights.38

time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party and
operates as an equitable bar.”); Lake Dev. Enters., Inc. v. Kojetinsky, 410
S.W.2d 361, 367 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966) (“Laches is the neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time under circumstances permitting diligence, to do
what in law, should have been done.”).
34. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 29, at 251 (“‘[A] court of equity may refuse
relief on the ground of laches although the pursuit of a legal remedy on the
same cause would not be barred by the applicable statute of limitations . . . .’”
(quoting WILLIAM DE FUNIAK, A HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 42 (2d ed. 1956))).
35. See Lake Dev. Enters. Inc., 410 S.W.2d at 367–68 (“There is no fixed
period within which a person must assert his claim or be barred by laches. The
length of time depends upon circumstances of the particular case.”); see also
RENDLEMAN, supra note 29, at 250 (“The statute of limitations is a fixed period,
ostensibly a rigid, and arbitrary all-or-nothing rule. The court-made rules that
comprise laches require both plaintiff’s unreasonable delay and defendant’s
prejudice; these imprecise factors and the chancellor’s discretion create
individualized, flexible, and contextual decisions.”).
36. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 29, at 250 (listing injunctions, specific
performance, and constructive trusts as types of equitable remedies generally
controlled by the doctrine of laches).
37. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000).
38. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (“Just determinations of
fact cannot be made when, because of the passage of time, the memories of
witnesses have faded or evidence is lost. In compelling circumstances, even
wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten.”).

IS TIME UP FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF?

2457

B. Concurrent Remedy Rule
As discussed above,39 the doctrine of laches often applies to
claims for equitable relief even when the expiration of the
relevant statute of limitations renders a related legal claim not
actionable. The concurrent remedy rule describes the interplay
between concurrent legal and equitable claims affected by a time
bar. In its decision in Cope v. Anderson,40 the Supreme Court
described the rule:
Even though these suits are in equity, the states’ statutes of
limitations apply. For it is only the scope of the relief sought
and the multitude of parties sued which gives equity
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the legal obligation here
asserted. And equity will withhold its relief in such a case
where the applicable statute of limitations would bar the
concurrent legal remedy.41

The concurrent remedy rule states that if the expiration of a
statute of limitations bars a legal claim, then a “concurrent”
equitable claim should be barred as well.42 Consequently, courts
39. Supra Part II.A.
40. 331 U.S. 461 (1947). In Cope, the plaintiff brought equitable suits in the
federal district courts of Ohio and Pennsylvania, attempting to enforce
assessments against resident stockholders of a debtor bank. Id. at 463. The
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Third Circuits disagreed upon whether the
state statutes of limitations should bar the equitable actions, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in order to decide the issue. Id. First, utilizing the
concurrent remedy rule, the Court determined that the state statutes of
limitations applied to these suits in equity. Id. The Court then considered
whether a five-year statute of limitations in Kentucky should bar the actions
due to “borrowing statutes” promulgated in Ohio and Pennsylvania, which
required that courts “bar suits against [that state’s] resident if the right to sue
him had already expired in another state where the combination of
circumstances giving rise to the right to sue had taken place.” Id. at 466.
Because the debtor bank was authorized only to conduct business in Louisville,
Kentucky, the Court concluded that the cause of action arose in Kentucky. Id. at
467. Thus, the Court ruled that the Kentucky cause of action barred the
plaintiff’s equitable claims for relief. Id. at 468.
41. Id. at 463–64.
42. See Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 289 (1940) (“Even though there is no
state statute applicable to similar equitable demands, when the jurisdiction of
the federal court is concurrent with that of law . . . equity will withhold its
remedy if the legal right is barred by the local statute of limitations.”); Williams
v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667, 671 (2d. Cir. 1977) (“The distinction between different
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must consider whether an equitable claim is “concurrent” with a
legal claim when they evaluate the applicability of the concurrent
remedy rule.
Whether an equitable claim is concurrent with a
corresponding legal claim centers on the jurisdictional division of
the Anglo-American judicial system. In medieval England, two
distinct courts—the Court at Law and the Court at Equity—
comprised the judicial system.43 The Court at Equity, also called
the Court at Chancery, developed in order to provide a more
flexible legal approach than the Court at Law employed.44
Because the Court at Equity developed specifically to foster just
results,45 the legal issues that fell under the jurisdiction of this
court were fundamentally different than those adjudicated in the
Court at Law.46 Vestiges of this jurisdictional distinction remain
today, as “[c]ontemporary ‘equitable’ substantive subjects include
causes of action and different remedies is important, however, because, in
contrast to the true independence of limitations periods controlling different
causes of action, the limitations periods governing two concurrent remedies, one
legal and the other equitable, are not independent of one another.”); see also
GEORGE L. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 31 n.4 (1919) (“Where an equity court
applies the statute of limitations by analogy, it is not necessary to plead the
statute . . . . Where law and equity jurisdictions are strictly concurrent, equity
courts consider themselves bound by the statute.”); EATON, supra note 31, at 53–
54 (“Courts of equity, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, consider themselves
bound by the statutes of limitation which govern courts of law in like cases . . .
because, where the legal remedy is barred, the spirit of the statute bars the
equitable remedy also.”).
43. See DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (2011)
(discussing the effects the dual judicial system had upon a plaintiff’s remedial
opportunities).
44. See id. at 264 (“Medieval Chancery was a separate judicial system
developed by the Chancellors in response to rigid or unsatisfactory legal rules.
Early Chancellors prided themselves on the flexibility to dispense with legal
rules that created justice.”); Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh
Amendment: A Commentary on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1572
(1983) (stating that “equity created the greater part of its jurisdiction by
abstractions from the common law”).
45. See Devlin, supra note 44, at 1572 (explaining that, historically, a
plaintiff had to demonstrate the court at law was acting unjustly to be heard by
the Chancellor).
46. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 43, at 264. (“Today several substantive
fields are classified as equitable because the medieval Chancellors developed
them. The Chancellors’ most important substantive contributions were to trusts,
mortgages, and bankruptcy.”).
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quiet title, partition, liens and mortgages, trusts, fiduciaries,
guardianships, dissolution of marriages, and adoptions.”47
Moreover, modern courts categorize possible remedies for
plaintiffs as either “equitable” or “legal.”48 Equitable remedies,
such as an injunction or specific performance, were available in
the Court at Equity, while the legal remedy of damages was
available in the Court at Law.49
Considering the historic division of the Courts at Law and
Equity, the meaning of “concurrent remedy” becomes clearer:
equitable remedies and legal remedies are concurrent when a
court can award either type of remedy in a particular action.50
Said another way, the concurrent remedy rule applies when a
court has jurisdiction to adjudicate both legal and equitable
matters.51
Because the modern American legal system merges the
distinct courts of law and equity into one court, the existence of
concurrent jurisdiction is extremely common.52 Courts exercising
general jurisdiction have the power to adjudicate both legal and
equitable matters.53 In fact, prominent legal scholar Zechariah
47. Id.
48. See id. (discussing the distinctions between legal and equitable
remedies in the modern American legal system).
49. See id. (discussing equitable, as opposed to legal, remedies).
50. See id. (“In these concurrent areas, a court may award a successful
plaintiff an injunction or compensatory damages, sometimes both.”).
51. See Devlin, supra note 44, at 1573–74 (“Thus, in addition to exclusive
equity, in which there was never any suit at common law at all, there arose
what came to be called concurrent equity made up of suits at common law that,
in effect, the Chancellor decided himself.”).
52. See Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive
Meaning of Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283, 312 (2002)
The merger of law and equity meant that ordinary legal rights, which
otherwise would have been cognizable in law courts that had
previously lacked jurisdiction over equitable remedies, had the
benefit of such remedies. Equity no longer could be defined as the
ability of a certain court to create a remedy for a theretofore
unrecognized right, but now meant the ability of all courts, including
the federal courts, to use the remedies that once were the province of
equity courts in any dispute that they determined deserved such
treatment and which met the qualifications established by the courts.
53. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 43, at 264 (“Today a court with general
jurisdiction decides what used to be called actions at law and suits in equity.”).
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Chafee, Jr. argued that traditional equity jurisdiction was
dependent not on judicial power, but rather on judicial discretion
and restraint.54 Chafee argued that a trial judge always has the
power, or jurisdiction, to issue both legal and equitable remedies
as he deems appropriate.55 Thus, according to Chafee, legal and
equitable jurisdictions are always concurrent.56 Although
Chafee’s view of the complete fusion of legal and equitable
jurisdiction may be extreme, it is widely accepted that courts
have concurrent jurisdiction in many legal areas, such as
contracts, torts, property, and constitutional law.57 Thus, for the
purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the courts discussed
have concurrent jurisdiction to award both legal and equitable
remedies.
Once a court has concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate both
legal and equitable matters, the concurrent remedy rule applies.
Although the text of the rule may seem unclear or confusing, the
rule simply reflects the impact that a statute of limitations has on
proving a claim of laches. The concurrent remedy rule states
“equity will withhold its relief in such a case where the applicable
54. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 304 (1950) (“The
opposite view, which I shall advocate as desirable, is that today, with law and
equity merged in a single court, ‘equity jurisdiction’ like exercise of jurisdiction
is simply a bundle of sound principles of decision concerning particular kinds of
relief.”); see also RENDLEMAN, supra note 43, at 264–65 (“Properly answered
today these questions are addressed to the judge’s wisdom and fairness, not to
the judge’s basic power to decide . . . . In other words, the court’s ‘equity
jurisdiction’ is not jurisdictional.”).
55. See CHAFEE, supra note 54, at 304 (“‘If the court has jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the parties nothing further is required’ to make the decree
an order which must be obeyed . . . . If the court gives specific relief contrary to
all the precedents, that is merely reversible error and not absence of power.”
(quoting O’Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354, 363 (1905))).
56. See id. at 304–05
In other words, when a suit for some kind of specific relief is brought
in a regular trial court and the parties are properly served or appear
voluntarily . . . then in my opinion the judge has power to decide,
rightly or wrongly, whether to give the relief sought or a different
kind of relief or no relief at all.
57. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 43, at 264 (“Equitable remedies, an
injunction or specific performance, and the legal remedy, damages, are
‘concurrently’ available to plaintiffs in contracts, torts, property, and
constitutional law.”).
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statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy.”58
This language corresponds with the notion that a court’s
dismissal of a claim due to a statute of limitations bar evidences a
proper dismissal of any corresponding equitable claims on the
grounds of laches.59 Consequently, the concurrent remedy rule
does not indicate a statute of limitations intended to control legal
relief should apply directly to equitable relief. Instead, the rule
provides that the expiration of a statute of limitations should be
used as powerful evidence of laches. In this way, equity still
withholds its relief, but the statute of limitations does not directly
apply to the equitable claim.
C. Statutes of Limitations and the Government’s Sovereign
Immunity
1. General Rule
In addition to considering the doctrine of laches and the
concurrent remedy rule, it is crucial to understand how a
government action affects the application of statutes of
limitation.60 The general rule regarding statutes of limitation and
the government is that “the government is not subject to any time
constraints in bringing its actions.”61 This rule stems from the
58. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947).
59. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Developments in the Law Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (1950)
In the absence of a controlling statute, courts enforcing rights
formerly cognizable in equity are still free to exercise discretion in
determining where the plaintiff should be barred. However, in areas
of concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law, equity has usually
considered the passage of time equivalent to the comparable statute
of limitations as presumptive of laches.
See also CLARK, supra note 42, at 31 (“[E]xcept in recent years [statutes of
limitations] have applied only to common law actions and not to suits in equity,
but equity courts have been accustomed, in the absence of special
circumstances, to apply the statute to equity suits by way of analogy.”).
60. See supra Part I (discussing § 2462 as it applies to actions brought by
the government, including actions brought by administrative agencies).
61. Mary V. Laitos et al., Equitable Defenses Against the Government in the
Natural Resources and Environmental Law Context, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 273,
302 (2000); see also Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132
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legal maxim quod nullum tempus occurrit regi, which literally
means “no time runs against the King.”62 Historically, the
doctrine of nullum tempus grew from the common law principles
that justified the sovereign immunity of the government.63
English courts reasoned that because the crown could not be
guilty of general negligence, it could not be guilty of negligent
delay.64 Courts justified this doctrine by claiming it prevented the
loss of public rights and property due to the negligence of crown
officials.65
Although these policy justifications for the doctrine of nullum
tempus, rooted in the power of the English monarch, may seem
inadequate today, additional modern considerations also support
the doctrine.66 Specifically, “the rule is supportable now because
its benefit and advantage extends to every citizen . . . whose pleas
of laches or limitation it precludes.”67 In sum, the general rule
that statutes of limitations do not apply against the government
is widely accepted.68
Despite this wide acceptance, an important caveat applies to
the statute of limitations imposed by § 2462. Namely, the
(1938) (stating that the “sovereign is exempt from the consequences of its laches,
and from the operation of statutes of limitations”).
62. See Joseph Mack, Nullum Tempus: Governmental Immunity to Statutes
of Limitations, Laches, and Statutes of Repose, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 180, 180
(2006) (describing the meaning of the nullum tempus doctrine).
63. See id. at 185–86 (describing the relationship between the doctrines of
sovereign immunity and nullum tempus).
64. See id. (“The crown could not be negligent, and therefore could not
suffer from any negligent delay, just as [it] could not suffer for negligently
causing its citizens injury.”).
65. See id. (“Thus, the ‘great public policy of preserving the public rights,
revenues and property from injury and loss, [sic] by the negligence of public
officers’ justifies immunity to statutes of limitations, just as it had justified
sovereign immunity.” (quoting United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330
(C.C.D. Mass. 1821))).
66. See id. at 186 (“[N]ullum tempus has evolved its own policy
justifications that are separate from, but nevertheless close to, the policies
driving sovereign immunity.”).
67. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 133 (1938).
68. See id. at 134 (“So complete has been [the general rule’s] acceptance
that the implied immunity of the domestic ‘sovereign,’ state or national, has
been universally deemed to be an exception to local statutes of limitations where
the government, state or national, is not expressly included . . . .”).
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doctrine of nullum tempus does not apply if the legislature
specifically indicates otherwise.69 This caveat to the general rule
is important because § 2462 is a statute of limitations created by
Congress with the explicit intention that it apply to government
action.70 Thus, the statute of limitations contained in § 2462
applies to claims brought by the government. Even though the
absolute bar does not apply to § 2462, it is helpful to consider the
law’s unfavorable treatment of statutes of limitation against the
government when discussing whether § 2462 applies to claims for
equitable relief.
Moreover, nullum tempus applies to the defense of laches as
well.71 Thus, unless Congress specifically indicates otherwise, a
laches defense should not be used against the government. The
text of § 2462 does not explicitly mention laches.72 As a result,
laches should not be used against the government to bar
injunctive relief pursuant to § 2462, even though a similar action
barring a legal claim may be proper. This interpretation of § 2462
supports the traditional position that the defense of laches should
not be used against the government acting in its sovereign
capacity.73

69. See United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 619 (6th Cir. 1979)
(“While the general rule . . . is that the sovereign is exempt from the operation of
statutes of limitations, an exception to that general rule exists when the
sovereign (through the legislature) expressly imposes a limitation period upon
itself.”); State v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408, 412 (S.C. 2000) (“Under the
nullum tempus doctrine, statutes of limitation do not run against the sovereign
unless the [l]egislature specifically provides otherwise.”).
70. See Teresa A. Holderer, Enforcement of TSCA and the Federal FiveYear Statute of Limitations for Penalty Actions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1032
(1993) (describing § 2462 as a statute of limitation that “clearly include[s] the
government”).
71. See United States v. Insley, 130 U.S. 263, 266 (1889) (“This doctrine is
applicable with equal force, not only to the question of a statute of limitations in
a suit at law, but also to the question of laches in a suit in equity.”).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012).
73. See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (“It is well
settled that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation or
subject to the defense of laches in enforcing its rights.”); United States v.
Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1878) (“Laches, however gross, cannot be imputed
to [the United States government].”); DOBBS, supra note 30, at 75–76 (stating
that laches may not be invoked to defeat the public interest).
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2. Statutory Construction

The law shows its disfavor of statutes of limitation barring
government action through statutory construction. When a court
determines that a statute of limitation should accrue against the
government, it will strictly construe the statute in favor of the
government.74 Courts strictly construe these statutes by reading
the statute closely, narrowly interpreting its language, and
choosing a meaning that favors the government when two
possible statutory interpretations exist.75 Like the bar against
statutes of limitation running against the government, the strict
statutory construction of these statutes in favor of the
government is not absolute. This rule of statutory construction
does not apply when the statute is explicitly intended for use
against the government.76 In fact, some scholars argue that
§ 2462 should not be entitled to a strict construction because
Congress wrote the statute with the express purpose of
controlling government action.77 However, because § 2462 does
not expressly apply to actions for injunctive relief, the statutory
language should be strictly construed for purposes of this
analysis.

74. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924)
(“Statutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar rights of the government,
must receive a strict construction in favor of the government.”); Holderer, supra
note 70, at 1031 (“As a corollary to government immunity, courts accept that
statutes of limitations that purportedly apply to the government must be strictly
construed in its favor.”).
75. See Holderer, supra note 70, at 1031 (“[Strict construction] means that
courts will read the statute closely and rigidly and will not broaden the statute’s
reach by implication. Further, where a statute is susceptible to more than one
interpretation, courts will choose the reading which favors the government.”).
76. See id. at 1032 (“‘Where a statute expressly includes the government
there is no room for the operation of the strict construction rule, and a statute of
this nature, like any other, is entitled to receive a sensible and reasonable
treatment.’” (quoting 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 62.02 (4th ed.
1986))).
77. See id. (“But, even if strict construction of statutes of limitations in
favor of the government persists, it should not be invoked when considered
section 2462’s application to a governmental penalty action.”).
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III. Circuit Splits
A. Eleventh Circuit
United States v. Banks78 is the leading case in the Eleventh
Circuit advocating that § 2462 should not bar claims for
injunctive relief. In Banks, Park Banks purchased three lots
located in Big Pine Key, Florida in 1980.79 Banks began to fill the
lots, and in March 1983 an Army Corps of Engineers biologist
“informed Banks that parts of [his lots] were wetlands and that
discharges onto those areas were unlawful without a permit.”80
Section 1344(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA)81 gives the
Secretary of the Army power to issue permits for the “discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified
disposal sites.”82 In April 1983, the “Corps issued a cease and
desist order, threatening enforcement action if Banks continued
his discharges.”83 The Army Corps of Engineers then denied
Banks’s application for an “after-the-fact permit,” and informed
Banks that “to avoid an enforcement action, he [would need to]
negotiate a restoration plan with them.”84 Banks failed to
negotiate such a plan and continued to discharge fill onto his
property.85 Furthermore, Banks acquired additional property in
1988, on which he added fill.86
In 1991, after issuing Banks four additional cease and desist
orders, the Government filed suit against Banks, seeking an
injunction as well as a civil penalty.87 Banks challenged the suit,
78. 115 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 1997).
79. See id. at 917 (describing relevant facts and background information of
the case).
80. Id. at 918.
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
82. Id. § 1344(a).
83. Banks, 115 F.3d at 918.
84. Id.
85. See id. (describing early interactions between Banks and the Army
Corps of Engineers).
86. See id. (noting that from 1988 to 1991 Banks continued to discharge fill
on his property and prepare additional lots for coconut farming).
87. See id.
In December 1991, the government filed this suit against Banks,

2466

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2449 (2013)

partly on the grounds that § 2462 barred the government from
seeking relief, both in the form of an injunction and civil penalty,
for actions conducted outside of the five-year period.88 The
Government argued that § 2462 should not apply to the
injunctive relief because “‘statutes of limitations are not
controlling measures of equitable relief.’”89 In contrast, Banks
argued that § 2462 applied to claims for equitable relief due to the
concurrent remedy rule.90
Agreeing with the Government, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded “that the concurrent remedy rule cannot properly be
invoked against the government when it seeks equitable relief in
its official enforcement capacity.”91 In its analysis, the court relied
on the “well-established rule that ‘an action on behalf of the United
States in its governmental capacity . . . is subject to no time
limitation, in the absence of congressional enactment clearly
imposing it.’”92 Additionally, the court cited the canon of statutory
construction that “any statute of limitations sought to be applied
against the United States ‘must receive a strict construction in
favor of the Government.’”93 The court determined that “absent a
clear expression of Congress to the contrary, a statute of limitation
does not apply to claims brought by the federal government in its
requesting that the district court enjoin future discharge of additional
dredged or fill materials into the wetlands on the property, require
Banks to restore the wetlands to their undisturbed condition before
such unlawful discharge by removing the fill and otherwise
implementing a restoration plan, and require Banks to pay an
appropriate civil penalty.
88. See id. at 918 (stating that while both parties agreed that § 2462
applied to the CWA, they disagreed as to “the applicability of this statute of
limitations to claims for equitable relief”).
89. Id. at 919 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946)).
90. See id. (discussing the tenets of the concurrent remedy rule).
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462
(1924)); United States v. Alvarado, 5 F.3d 1425, 1427 (11th Cir. 1993).
Moreover, the court specifically addressed the importance of the United States
acting in its governmental capacity, stating “[t]he statute is enforced against the
government only when the government is acting to vindicate private interests,
not a sovereign or public interest.” Id.
93. United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 919 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Alvarado, 5 F.3d at 1428).
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sovereign capacity.”94 The court then concluded that § 2462 did not
apply to claims of injunctive relief because there existed no clear
expression of congressional intent in the statutory language
indicating that § 2462 should indeed bar these equitable claims.95
B. Ninth Circuit
Federal Election Committee v. Williams96 is the leading Ninth
Circuit case arguing that § 2462 should bar claims for injunctive
relief. The Federal Election Committee (FEC) investigated Larry
Williams for alleged violations of election laws during the 1988
presidential election campaign.97 Williams’s alleged violations
occurred between the autumn of 1987 and January of 1988;
however, the FEC did not file suit until October 19, 1993, at
which time it sought the enforcement of civil penalties as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief.98
Williams filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the FEC
filed its complaint after the five-year statute of limitations
contained in § 2462 had expired.99 The district court denied
Williams’s motion and granted partial summary judgment in
favor of the FEC.100 Williams appealed the decision, at which
time the FEC argued that “§ 2462 does not apply to actions for
injunctive relief.”101 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the FEC’s
argument contradicted the Supreme Court’s decision in Cope,
which enforced the concurrent remedy rule.102 In doing so, the
94. Id.
95. See id. (“Because Congress did not expressly indicate otherwise in the
statutory language of section 2462, its provisions apply only to civil penalties;
the government’s equitable claims against Banks are not barred.”).
96. 104 F.3d 237 (9th Cir. 1996).
97. See id. at 239 (describing the factual background of the Williams case).
98. See id. (describing the factual background of the Williams case).
99. See id. (“Williams argues that [§ 2462] applies on its face to FEC suits
to impose civil penalties.”).
100. See id. (“The district court denied Williams’ motion to dismiss on
limitations grounds and partially granted FEC’s motion for summary judgment
on January 31, 1995.”).
101. Id. at 240.
102. See id. (“Cope holds that ‘equity will withhold its relief in such a case
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Ninth Circuit stated, “because the claim for injunctive relief is
connected to the claim for legal relief, the statute of limitations
applies to both.”103 The Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that all
of the FEC’s claims were untimely filed and reversed the district
court’s decision in favor of Williams.104 Although the court in
Williams does not address its acceptance of the concurrent
remedy rule in great detail, this case provides a clear example of
a court holding that § 2462 applies to claims for both injunctive
and legal relief.
C. Tenth Circuit and Fifth Circuit
As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit fundamentally
rejected the notion that § 2462 applies to injunctive relief, while
the Ninth Circuit adopted the concurrent remedy rule without
significant explanation.105 The Tenth and Fifth Circuits, however,
undertook an in-depth analysis of § 2462 and adopted a more
nuanced approach when deciding whether the statute of
limitations should apply to claims for injunctive relief.
1. Tenth Circuit
The most significant case on this issue in the Tenth Circuit is
United States v. Telluride Co.106 In Telluride, the United States
alleged that Telluride Co. (Telco) had violated provisions of the
Clean Water Act and subsequently filed suit on October 15,
1993.107 The Government claimed that Telco had illegally filled
approximately forty-five acres of wetland between 1981 and 1989,
where the applicable statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal
remedy.’”(quoting Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947)).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 241 (finding that the FEC’s suit was “untimely and should
have been dismissed”).
105. Supra Parts III.A–B.
106. 146 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998).
107. See id. at 1243 (“On October 15, 1993, the United States filed a civil
action against Telco in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado under § 309 of the Clean Water Act, 33. U.S.C. § 1319.”).

IS TIME UP FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF?

2469

and sought civil monetary penalties and injunctive relief.108
Specifically, the Government “sought to enjoin Telco from
discharging additional material, and to require Telco to restore
damaged wetlands to their prior condition or create new wetland
to replace those that could not be restored.”109
Telco then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
the Government’s claims for violations that occurred before
October 15, 1988, arguing that the five-year statute of limitations
contained in § 2462 barred these actions.110 Although the
Government conceded that the statute of limitations prohibited
claims for civil penalties, it argued that § 2462 did not apply to
claims for injunctive relief and, thus, their equitable claims were
not barred.111 The district court, however, applied the concurrent
remedy rule and withheld the Government’s claim for injunctive
relief because § 2462 barred its claims for civil penalties.112
The Government appealed the district court’s decision,
arguing that the court “erred in applying § 2462 to bar its claims
for equitable relief, because the ruling is contrary to the wellsettled principles restricting the applications of time limitations
against the government, and is contrary to the plain language of
the statute.”113 As the Eleventh Circuit did in Banks, the Tenth
Circuit interpreted the language of § 2462 narrowly.114 The court
108. See id. (discussing the background facts of the case).
109. Id.
110. See id. (“Telco subsequently filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on all of the Government’s claims for violations that occurred before
October 15, 1988, contending these claims were barred by the five-year statute
of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462.”).
111. See id. (“The Governnment conceded § 2462 applied to its claim for civil
penalties, but argued the statute did not bar its claims for injunctive relief.”).
112. See id. at 1243–44 (“Consequently, because § 2462 barred the
Government’s claims for legal relief, civil monetary penalties, the court held
§ 2462 barred the Government’s claims for injunctive relief.”).
113. Id. at 1244.
114. See id. at 1244–45
We interpret § 2462 narrowly because “an action on behalf of the
United States in its governmental capacity . . . is subject to no time
limitation, in the absence of congressional enactment clearly
imposing it.” In addition, “statutes of limitation sought to be applied
to bar rights of the government, must receive a strict construction in
favor of the government.” (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
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then conducted a thorough analysis focusing on the statutory
construction of § 2462, departing from the Eleventh Circuit’s
discussion.115 The court primarily focused on whether the phrase
“pecuniary or otherwise” modified only the term “forfeiture,” as
claimed by the Government, or whether it modified the term
“penalty” as well.116 Citing previously amended versions of
§ 2462, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the term “pecuniary or
otherwise” should modify both “penalty” and “forfeiture.”117
Likewise, the court then construed § 2462 “as applying to nonmonetary penalties.”118
The Tenth Circuit next addressed the Government’s claim
that the “plain language of § 2462 does not apply to claims for
equitable relief.”119 In doing so, the court recognized that “actions
for equitable relief typically are not actions for penalties or
fines,”120 and that “‘statutes of limitation are not controlling
measures of equitable relief.’”121 Telco, however, argued that the
proposed injunction was a nonmonetary penalty and, therefore,
was subject to the statute of limitations imposed by § 2462.122
Because § 2462 did not contain a definition for the term
“penalty,” the court conducted its own analysis, concluding that a
penalty, for the purpose of § 2462, was “a sanction or punishment
imposed for violating a public law which goes beyond
compensation for the injury caused by the defendant.”123
Moreover, the court focused its definition of penalty on “whether
the sanction seeks compensation unrelated to, or in excess, of the

Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924) (citations omitted)).
115. See id. at 1245 (discussing statutory interpretation of § 2462).
116. See id. (discussing statutory interpretation of § 2462).
117. See id. (“Based on this construction, we view ‘pecuniary or otherwise’ as
modifying both the terms penalty and forfeiture.”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946)).
122. See id. (“Telco contends the restorative injunction is a penalty under
§ 2462 since it imposes a sanction for violating a public law which is not
determined or predicated on actual damages to the [g]overnnment.”).
123. Id. at 1246.

IS TIME UP FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF?

2471

damages caused by the defendant.”124 Ultimately, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the restorative injunction at issue could
not be considered a penalty.125 Consequently, the court
determined that the government’s claim for injunctive relief was
not barred by § 2462.126 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit decided
that the concurrent remedy rule did not apply in the instant
case.127 In doing so, the court relied on the rationale espoused in
Banks and refused to apply the concurrent remedy rule against
the government acting in its sovereign capacity.128
Although the Tenth Circuit’s final ruling in Telluride is
similar to that of the Eleventh Circuit in Banks, the Telluride
decision is significant because the Tenth Circuit’s analysis
focuses on whether an injunction might be considered a penalty,
rather than summarily dismissing the notion. Telluride did not
apply a general standard, but instead chose to tackle the issue on
a case-by-case basis. As a result, it seems possible that, under
this standard, there may be a scenario in which equitable relief
could be deemed a penalty, and, thus, be barred by § 2462.
2. Fifth Circuit
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit considered whether
an injunction could be considered a penalty under the meaning of
§ 2462. Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit concluded in
Securities Exchange Commission v. Bartek129 that an injunction
124. Id.
125. See id. (explaining that the “injunction does not seek compensation
unrelated to or in excess of the damages caused by Telco’s acts”).
126. See id. at 1248 (“Based on the consideration addressed above, and in
light of the traditional notions statute of limitations should be strictly construed
in favor of the [g]overnment, we do not consider the [g]overnment’s request for
injunctive relief an action for a ‘civil penalty’ barred by § 2462.”).
127. See id. at 1249 (concluding that the “concurrent remedy rule does not
bar the Government’s claims for equitable relief”).
128. See id. at 1248 (“Specifically, the Banks [c]ourt refused to apply the
concurrent remedy rule based on the principles that a suit by the United States
in its governmental capacity is not subject to a time limitation unless Congress
explicitly imposes one . . . .”).
129. 484 Fed. App’x 949 (5th Cir. 2012).
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was a penalty, and therefore, § 2462 controlled claims for both
equitable and legal relief.130
In Bartek, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
filed a complaint on June 30, 2008, charging the defendants—
officers of the company Microtune—with fraud.131 The charges
related to questionable stock dating practices exercised by the
defendants from 2000 to 2003.132 In its original complaint, the
SEC sought “civil penalties, . . . permanent injunctions and officer
and director bars against the defendants.”133 Both parties filed
motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted
the defendants’ motion, which asked that all forms of relief be
barred by the statute of limitations found in § 2462.134 In doing
so, the district court ruled that § 2462 barred the SEC’s claim for
injunctive relief in addition to the legal remedies at issue.135
In Bartek, the Fifth Circuit primarily considered when the
§ 2462 statute of limitations accrues in a fraud action.136 The
court, however, also reviewed whether the district court erred in
deciding that § 2462 barred claims for injunctive relief.137 The
130. See id. at 957 (“Based on the severity and permanent nature of the
sought-after [equitable] remedies, the district court did not [err] in denying the
SEC’s request on grounds that the remedies are punitive, and are thus subject
to § 2462’s time limitations.”).
131. See id. at 951 (“The SEC filed its original Complaint on June 30,
2008 . . . . The SEC alleged that the Defendants committed fraud.”).
132. See id. at 950 (“The SEC alleges that from 2000 to 2003, the
Defendants improperly backdated stock options that the company granted to
newly hired and existing employees and executives.”).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 951 (“The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment
on various issues including a statute of limitations defense . . . . The district
court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on statute of limitations
grounds.”).
135. See id. (“All forms of relief were found to be penalties under § 2462, and
thus subject to its time limitations.”).
136. The Supreme Court recently decided this issue, ruling in Gabelli v.
SEC that the statute of limitations contained in § 2462 accrues for a fraud
action at the time the fraud is committed, not at the time the fraud is
discovered. See Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1224 (2013) (“Given the lack of
textual, historical, or equitable reasons to graft a discovery rule onto the statute
of limitations of § 2462, we decline to do so.”).
137. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
analysis in Bartek).
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appellate court first cited the district court’s rationale for
concluding, as a matter of law, that the officer–director bars and
injunctive relief were penalties under § 2462.138 The district court
concluded that these claims for relief were penalties, stating that
“these remedies would have significant collateral consequences to
the Defendants; they do not address the past harm caused by the
Defendants; and the remedies do not focus on preventing future
harm due to the low likelihood that the Defendants would engage
in similar harmful behavior in the future.”139
The appellate court then considered many possible
definitions for the term “penalty,” all of which focused on the
punitive nature of the remedy.140 The SEC argued that the term
“penalty” should be construed narrowly to include only sanctions
involving money and property.141 The appellate court, however,
concluded that “penalty,” as used in § 2462, should be interpreted
broadly to include a wide variety of punishments.142 The court
determined that “whether an injunction here is a ‘penalty’ or
simply remedial requires a look at the nature or characteristic of
the injunction.”143 Ultimately, after considering the nature of the
injunction at issue, the appellate court decided that the district
court had not erred in determining that the injunction was a
penalty as a matter of law.144 For these reasons, the appellate
court affirmed the district court’s decision to subject the SEC’s

138. See SEC v. Bartek, 484 Fed. App’x 949, 956 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The
[district] court denied the request finding that injunctive relief and O/D bars, as
a matter of law, are construed as penalties . . . .”).
139. Id.
140. See id. (listing various legal definitions for the term “penalty”).
141. See id. (“The SEC cites various authorities to argue that § 2462 is
limited to a sanction that involves the collecting of money or property.”).
142. See id. at 957 (“The term ‘penalty’ is not strictly used for monetary or
property sanctions but rather encompasses a variety of punishments (e.g. death
penalty). The SEC’s narrow interpretation is incorrect.”).
143. Id.
144. See id. (“The SEC’s sought-after remedies would have a stigmatizing
effect and long-lasting repercussions . . . . Here, the SEC is essentially seeking a
lifetime ban against the Defendants. Courts have held that such long term bans
can be construed as punitive.”).
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claims for injunctive relief to the statute of limitations included
in § 2462.145
The Fifth Circuit in Bartek, like the Tenth Circuit in
Telluride, took a nuanced approach to the question of whether
§ 2462 applies to claims for injunctive and legal relief. The court
rejected the notion that injunctions could not be construed as
penalties per se. By finding that the injunctive relief sought by
the SEC had punitive qualities, the court opened the door for
§ 2462 to control certain types of injunctions, dependent upon the
specific characteristics of the individual claim. If Bartek’s
rationale is accepted, § 2462 would control certain injunctions
regardless of whether the concurrent remedy rule barred them as
well.
IV. Analysis
Although the circuit courts discussed in Part III differed in
their opinions on whether § 2462 applies to claims for injunctive
relief, each court’s analysis followed essentially the same path.
Specifically, each court considered whether the statute, on its
face, controlled claims for injunctive relief, or whether the
concurrent remedy rule could be used to bar a claim for injunctive
relief when the statute of limitation barred corresponding legal
claims. Consequently, it is helpful to follow this same logical
roadmap when analyzing whether § 2462 applies to claims for
injunctive relief.
A. Statutory Text
While each court discussed in Part III considered, at least
implicitly, whether the language of § 2462 directly controlled
actions for injunctive relief, the Tenth Circuit and Fifth Circuit
made statutory construction and interpretation the focal point of
145. See id. (“Based on the severity and permanent nature of the soughtafter remedies, the district court did not [err] in denying the SEC’s request on
grounds that the remedies are punitive, and are thus subject to § 2462’s time
limitations.”).
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their analyses.146 In doing so, each court discussed whether the
injunctive relief sought could be deemed a penalty and thus fall
within the scope of the statute.147 This approach, however, is
incomplete. In order to determine whether the statute of
limitations contained in § 2462 applies to claims for injunctive
relief, courts must study the fundamental characteristics of
injunctions and decide whether such relief qualifies as a civil fine,
penalty, or forfeiture within the meaning of the statute. When a
court conducts this mode of analysis, it is imperative that it
interprets § 2462 strictly because it is a statute of limitation
applied against the government.148
1. Characteristics of Injunctive Relief
The injunction is the quintessential form of equitable
relief.149 An injunction differs from forms of legal relief because of
its coercive nature.150 This means that an injunction is “intended
to force the defendant to act or cease from acting in specified
ways.”151 To accomplish this goal, injunctions act against the
person, or in personam.152 Courts enforce these personal orders
with their power to hold an individual who disregards an
injunction in contempt, which is an exertion of the court’s power
over the “person” of a defendant.153 In this way, the in personam
146. See supra Part III.C.1–2 (discussing those courts’ analysis).
147. See supra notes 119–28, 138–45 (discussing the circuit courts’ analyses
of the nature of injunctions).
148. See supra Part II.C (discussing the concept of sovereign immunity).
149. See DOBBS, supra note 30, at 9 (“The damages remedy was historically a
legal remedy. The injunction and most other coercive remedies were
equitable.”).
150. See id. at 49 (“Most often, however, equitable remedies are coercive.
The coercive remedies in equity are variants of the injunction.”).
151. Id. at 51.
152. See id. at 49 (“Variations on the injunctive remedy will quickly appear.
The essence of the remedy in most instances, however, is the in personam order,
enforced by the distinctive power of contempt.”).
153. See id. (“These coercive remedies were distinctive. They were enforced
by the power of contempt if necessary. That is, the defendant might be fined or
imprisoned for failure to comply with the order and might be held in prison until
he complied or indicated a willingness to do so.”).
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nature of an injunction distinguishes it from other forms of relief
historically available at law.154
Another important characteristic of injunctive relief stems
from its role as the preferred remedy of courts at Chancery,
which were primarily concerned with reaching just results.155
Consequently, although injunctions are intended to force a person
to act in a certain way, they are not generally considered punitive
in nature.156 It is important to remember that although an
injunction will likely cause a party hardship, this does not mean
it is fundamentally punitive.157 Instead, injunctions are
considered remedial in nature.158
In sum, courts must consider the fact that injunctions act in
personam and are historically remedial—as opposed to punitive—
in nature when they consider whether § 2462 controls claims for
injunctive relief.
2. Fines and Injunctive Relief
According to the text of § 2462, the statute of limitations
controls “an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any
civil fine.”159 Thus, if an injunction can be considered a civil fine,
the statute of limitations will control it. A fine is defined as a
“pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to the

154. See id. (“The old separate law courts did not issue injunctive orders;
they rendered judgments instead. The law courts did not seek to enforce their
orders by contempt powers, but by seizure of property.”).
155. See id. at 55 (“Equity is said to be flexible rather than rigid, its interest
justice rather than the law.”).
156. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“The historic
injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish.”).
157. See United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“Telco’s belief the sanctions is costly or painful does not make it punitive. If the
determination of whether a sanction is a penalty was made from the defendant’s
perspective, then virtually every sanction would be considered a penalty since
‘even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.’” (quoting United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 (1989) (citations omitted))).
158. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 435 (1945)
(stating that “relief in equity is remedial, not penal”).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012) (emphasis added).
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public treasury.”160 This definition contrasts with the traditional
characteristics of injunctions in two significant ways.
First, a fine is “pecuniary” and “payable to the county
treasury.”161 This language clearly denotes that fines are
monetary in nature. As discussed above, injunctions are forms of
relief that typically operate in personam.162 This signifies that
while a fine operates against a person’s property, an injunction
operates against a person’s “person.” Therefore, because fines and
injunctions function in two completely different manners, courts
must consider them distinct forms of relief.
Second, a fine is defined as a “criminal punishment” or “civil
penalty”—language that denotes that fines are punitive in
nature.163 This characteristic is a stark contrast from the
injunction’s role as a form of remedial relief.164 Because fines are
inherently punitive in nature, while injunctions are traditionally
remedial, the two must be categorized as distinct forms of relief.
Thus, a fine is a punitive remedy that is monetary in nature,
while an injunction is a form of remedial relief that acts in
personam. These two remedies are fundamentally at odds;
consequently, courts should not consider an injunction a fine for
the purpose of § 2462.
3. Penalties and Injunctive Relief
a. General Penalties
The statute of limitations contained in § 2462 pertains to an
action for the enforcement of any “penalty.”165 A penalty is
generally defined as a punishment imposed upon a wrongdoer,
either in the form of imprisonment or a fine.166 Therefore, a
160. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (9th ed. 2009).
161. Id.
162. Supra Part IV.A.1.
163. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (defining the term “fine”).
164. See supra Part IV.A.1 (exploring the characteristics of injunctive relief).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012).
166. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (9th ed. 2009) (“Punishment imposed
on a wrongdoer, [usually] in the form of imprisonment or fine; [especially] a sum
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penalty, by definition, is punitive in nature. This characterization
of a penalty clearly differs from the injunction’s characterization
as remedial relief.167 Moreover, penalties are traditional forms of
legal relief, while injunctions are traditional forms of equitable
relief.168 For these reasons, an injunction should not be
considered a type of penalty for the purposes of § 2462.
Courts are prone to make mistakes when they consider
whether injunctions are penalties for the purposes of § 2462.
Indeed, both the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit undertook
this question in their analyses of whether § 2462 barred claims
for injunctive relief.169 Only the Tenth Circuit, however, correctly
concluded that the injunction at issue was not a penalty for the
purposes of the statute.170 In its decision in Bartek, the Fifth
Circuit decided that injunctions that enjoined defendants from
violating securities laws and serving as officers or directors of
public companies were penalties under § 2462.171
The Fifth Circuit erred by interpreting the definition of
penalty broadly, even though statutes of limitations against the
government should receive a strict construction.172 Additionally,
of money exacted as punishment for either a wrong to the state or a civil wrong
(as distinguished from compensation for the injured party’s loss.”).
167. See supra Part IV.A.1 (exploring the characteristics of injunctive relief).
168. See George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied
Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 19 (2007) (“The assessment of penalties or the
application of punitive statutory provisions are not remedies in equity but
rather remedies at law.”).
169. See supra Part III.C.1–2 (exploring the Tenth and Fifth Circuits’
analyses of the issue).
170. See Telluride Co. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“Consistent with our definition, the restorative injunction in this case is not a
penalty because it seeks to restore only the wetlands damaged by Telco’s acts to
the status quo or to create new wetlands for those that cannot be restored.”).
171. See SEC v. Bartek, 484 Fed. App’x 949, 957 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Based on
the severity and permanent nature of the sought-after remedies, the district
court did not [err] in denying the SEC’s request on grounds that the remedies
are punitive, and are thus subject to § 2462’s time limitations.”).
172. See id. at 956 (“The SEC cites various authority to argue that § 2462 is
limited to a sanction that involves the collecting of money or property. These
authorities do not limit the term ‘penalty’ to the narrower definition that the
SEC suggests.”). But see supra Part II.C.2 (arguing that § 2462 should be
construed narrowly because it is a statute of limitation acting against the
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the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s statement
that “even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment”
when it decided whether the injunction in question was a
penalty.173 This statement, when considered in light of the
traditional view of injunctions as nonpunitive relief, stands for
the proposition that even though injunctions are typically
remedial, their mandates may cause the affected party some
degree of hardship.174 This statement does not mean that some
injunctions should be classified as a penalty, as this
interpretation completely contradicts one of the central
characteristics of injunctive relief. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
wrongly confused an injunction’s coercive power to affect personal
behavior with a penalty’s power to punish.
As the Fifth Circuit displayed in its analysis in Bartek, it is
easy to confuse the coercive power of an injunction with the
punitive power of a penalty. Moreover, if a court erroneously
labels an injunction as a penalty, that court will also incorrectly
hold that § 2462 applies to injunctive relief. To avoid this result,
courts should treat all injunctions as remedial per se, and refuse
to engage in the case-by-case analysis advocated by the Tenth
and Fifth Circuits. This approach will add a level of certainty to
the issue of whether § 2462 applies to claims for injunctive relief,
thus advancing one of the main public policy objectives common
to all time restrictions.175 Furthermore, this approach also
conforms to the notion that courts should strictly construe the
terms of a statute of limitation applied against the government.
b. Civil Penalties
While the Tenth and Fifth Circuits considered whether an
injunction could generally be considered a penalty and therefore
government).
173. Id. at 957 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7
(1989)).
174. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing the falsity of
considering an injunction punitive in nature).
175. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing the main policy
objectives of time bars).
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subject to the statute of limitations contained in § 2462, there is
another possible reading of the statute that gives the term
“penalty” an alternate meaning. Specifically, if courts construe
“civil” to modify “penalty,” then § 2462 would control claims for
injunctive relief if the court deemed an injunction a civil
penalty.176
A civil penalty is a “fine assessed for a violation of a statute
or regulation.”177 Although courts have disagreed over whether
injunctions can generally be considered penalties, jurisdictions
agree that civil penalties are traditionally legal remedies.178
Because injunctions are the quintessential form of equitable
relief, an injunction cannot be a civil penalty. Therefore, if courts
construe the language of § 2462 to include civil penalties, the
statute cannot bar claims for injunctive relief.179

176. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012)
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or
proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced
within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within
the same period, the offender or the property is found within the
United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.
177. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (9th ed. 2009).
178. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987)
A civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could only
be enforced in courts of law. Remedies intended to punish culpable
individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract
compensation or restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law,
not courts of equity.
See also SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that civil
penalties are a legal, not equitable, form of relief).
179. It is worth noting that in a recent decision discussing the accrual of a
fraud claim under § 2462, the Supreme Court referred to the SEC’s requested
relief as a “civil penalty.” See Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1219 (2013)
(discussing the statute’s requirement that an action for a “civil penalty” be
brought within five years from the date it first accrued).
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4. Forfeiture and Injunctive Relief
a. General Forfeiture
In addition to fines and penalties, the language of § 2462 also
controls claims for forfeitures.180 Forfeiture is defined as the
“divestiture of property without compensation.”181 Forfeitures are
typically penal judgments against money or property.182 Thus,
because injunctions are typically remedial and act in personam,
courts should not construe injunctions as a type of forfeiture for
the purposes of § 2462.
b. Civil Forfeiture
Like the term “penalty,” if courts conclude that the term
“civil” modifies “forfeiture” in the construction of § 2462, the
statute of limitations applies to “civil forfeitures.”183 A civil
forfeiture is “[a]n in rem proceeding brought by the government
against property that either facilitated a crime or was acquired as
a result of criminal activity.”184 Because injunctions are
traditionally proceedings that act in personam, a claim for
injunctive relief should not be considered a civil forfeiture for the
purposes of interpretation of § 2462.
5. Conclusion
One possible way for the statute of limitations contained in
§ 2462 to apply to claims for injunctive relief is for courts to
conclude that injunctions fall within the forms of relief contained
within the text of the statute. Namely, courts must construe
injunctive relief as a civil fine, a penalty, or a forfeiture. If courts
construe these terms strictly, they should find that injunctive
180. 28 U.S.C. § 2642.
181. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (9th ed. 2009).
182. See id. (“Something ([especially] money or property) lost or confiscated
by this process; a penalty.”).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012).
184. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (9th ed. 2009).
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relief, due to its remedial and in personam characteristics, falls
outside the definitions of these terms. Consequently, § 2462 does
not bar actions for injunctive relief based on a facial analysis of
the statutory terms.
B. Concurrent Remedy Rule
When courts conclude that the text of the statute of
limitations contained in § 2462 does not bar claims for injunctive
relief, they should then consider whether the concurrent remedy
rule bars such claims. The concurrent remedy rule stands for the
proposition that “equity will withhold its relief in such a case
where the applicable statute of limitations would bar the
concurrent legal remedy.”185 As discussed above, this doctrine
simply supports the notion that a court’s dismissal of a legal
claim due to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations
is strong evidence supporting a court’s decision to dismiss a
corresponding equitable claim due to the doctrine of laches.186
Moreover, the concurrent remedy rule does not state that a
statute of limitations should directly control claims for equitable
relief, including injunctions.187 In this way, both the Eleventh
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit applied the concurrent remedy rule
in error when considering whether the statute of limitations in
§ 2462 barred claims for injunctive relief.188
In Banks, the Eleventh Circuit failed to apply the concurrent
remedy rule to the analysis of whether § 2462 bars claims for
185. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947).
186. See supra Part II.B (examining the nature of the concurrent remedy
rule).
187. Supra Part II.B.
188. This subpart focuses on the analysis conducted by the Eleventh Circuit
in Banks and the Ninth Circuit in Williams. In Telluride, the Tenth Circuit
chose to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s line of reasoning in Banks when
discussing the concurrent remedy rule. See United States v. Telluride Co., 146
F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998) (“For the same reasons applied in Banks, we
conclude the concurrent remedy rule does not bar the Government’s claims for
equitable relief.”). Consequently, the analysis of the Eleventh Circuit’s
reasoning can be applied to the Tenth Circuit. Additionally, in Bartek, the Fifth
Circuit failed to consider the concurrent remedy rule in its analysis of § 2462.
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit is omitted from this discussion.
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injunctive relief.189 In doing so, the court focused on the fact that
“‘[t]raditionally, ‘statutes of limitation are not controlling
measures of equitable relief.’”190 Although this is true, it is also
immaterial, as the concurrent remedy rule does not stand for the
proposition that a statute of limitation should directly control
claims for equitable relief. Additionally, the court refuses to apply
the concurrent remedy rule to its analysis because “‘an action on
behalf of the United States in its governmental capacity . . . is
subject to no time limitation, in the absence of congressional
enactment clearly imposing it.’”191 Finally, the court refused to
apply the concurrent remedy rule because “any statute of
limitations sought to be applied against the United States ‘must
receive a strict construction in favor of the Government.’”192 It is
possible, however, to give these tenets of statutory construction
their full effect and still apply the concurrent remedy rule.
Even applying a strict construction to the statute of
limitation contained in § 2462, it is clear that Congress intended
the provision to be applied against the government.193 Because
the statute of limitations of § 2462 applies against the
government, its expiration can be used as evidence that a laches
claim would also bar any concurrent claims for equitable relief.
Thus, the concurrent remedy rule applies in this situation.
The application of the concurrent remedy rule, however, does
not complete the analysis. Even though the concurrent remedy
rule holds that a laches claim would technically be proper, the
defense of laches should not be used against the government to
bar injunctive relief under § 2462.194 Therefore, even though the
concurrent remedy rule applies, actions for injunctive relief are
189. See United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 919 (11th Cir. 1997) (“We
conclude, therefore, that the concurrent remedy rule cannot properly be invoked
against the government when it seeks equitable relief in its official enforcement
capacity.”).
190. Id. (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946)).
191. Id. (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462
(1944); United States v. Alvarado, 5 F.3d 1425, 1427 (11th Cir. 1993)).
192. Id. (quoting Alvarado, 5. F.3d at 1427).
193. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (discussing the
government’s intent in passing § 2462).
194. See supra notes 71–73 (discussing whether laches should be applied
against the government).
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not barred by § 2462. The Eleventh Circuit reached the correct
result, but did so through an incorrect logical analysis.
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit applied an improper analysis of
the concurrent remedy rule in Williams.195 When the court
applied the concurrent remedy rule in Williams, it stated that
“because the claim for injunctive relief is connected to the claim
for legal relief, the statute of limitations applies to both.”196 As
discussed above, the concurrent remedy rule does not state that
the statute of limitations applies to both claims for legal and
equitable relief.197 Thus, the court applied the concurrent remedy
rule incorrectly and failed to recognize that the expiration of the
statute of limitations for a legal claim is evidence of laches, which
cannot be applied against the government.
In sum, the concurrent remedy rule technically applies to
§ 2462 as evidence that a laches claim is proper when
corresponding legal claims are barred. Injunctive relief, however,
should not be barred because laches should not be applied against
the government under § 2462.
V. Recommendations
The statute of limitations contained in § 2462 applies only
against the U.S. government.198 Consequently, courts must
construe the terms of this statute strictly.199 When courts apply
this mode of analysis, they will find that injunctive relief, due to
its remedial and in personam nature, does not constitute a civil
fine, penalty, or forfeiture under the statute.200 As a result, courts
should reject outright the notion that § 2462 may bar injunctive
195. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
treatment of the concurrent remedy rule).
196. FEC v. Williams, 104 F.3d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1996).
197. See supra Part II.B (examining the meaning of the concurrent remedy
rule).
198. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of 28
U.S.C. § 2462).
199. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the statutory construction of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462).
200. See supra Parts IV.A.2–4 (examining the types of remedies discussed in
28 U.S.C. § 2462).
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relief depending on the characteristics of the individual
injunction. In doing so, courts will provide a level of certainty to
litigants and advance public policies common to all time
restrictions by fostering consistent and predictable decisions.201
Furthermore, courts should generally apply the concurrent
remedy rule in all actions where they have the power to grant
both legal and equitable relief.202 When courts apply this rule,
they should treat the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations as evidence that an action for laches is proper.203 Even
though the concurrent remedy rule should normally bar actions
for injunctive relief when the corresponding statute of limitation
expires, courts must extend their analyses one step further and
conclude that the defense of laches should not be used against the
government under § 2462.204 Thus, courts should rule that § 2462
does not bar claims for injunctive relief, advancing the
fundamental policy that no time bars should run against the
government unless Congress expresses a clear intention for them
to do so.205

201. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing public policy
benefits of time bars).
202. See supra Part II.B (examining the nature of concurrent jurisdiction of
law and equity).
203. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the applicability of the concurrent
remedy rule).
204. See supra notes 71–73 (discussing the applications of the laches
doctrine in actions against the United States government).
205. See supra Part II.C (discussing sovereign immunity).

